'Since the granting of the Bid, there has been a profusion of legislation proposed and enacted directed at the regulation of the behaviour of the population'

'The crackdown on homeless people is graphically illustrated by the fact that 10,000 homeless people were arrested in downtown Atlanta from July 1995 to July 1996, more than four times the usual number, and the arrest of homeless people skyrocketed in the week leading up to the Games'

T he Olympics represent a boom for business, but what does it mean for us? The image of an unruly, crime ridden population, or a dramatic terrorist stand-off, televised to the world would be a blow to the prestige of the nation. It also risks jeopardising the chance for the Olympics to give Sydney that "Olympic glamour", important in attracting tourists and capitalist development dollars. Strategies to maximise the economic benefits of massive international exposure focus on making the city look safe, and society appear stable and free from tension. This is where the police come into the picture. Historically, police have been used to regulate and control the behaviour of people in public space through the use of street offence's legislation. This remains true today.

Since the granting of the bid, there has been a profusion of legislation proposed and enacted directed at the regulation of the behaviour of the population. This has included expansion of search, move-on and dispersal powers available to police, and powers to demand identification. Simultaneously, there has been a trend towards equipping police with further weapons - the 22 Glock automatic 15 shot pistol, capsicum spray, metal detectors and technology offender database catalogues containing offenders' facial features and distinctive characteristics, electronic mapping and surveillance cameras.

The reasons for this rapid expansion in the powers of police are complex, and it is difficult to isolate the Olympics as a sole or major factor. However, the experience of other Olympic cities foreshadows problems which may emerge in Sydney.

'Street sweeps' occurred in the Los Angeles, Barcelona and Atlanta Olympics. In Atlanta, city ordinances passed just before the 1996 Atlanta Olympics targeted loitering in downtown parking lots. It became illegal to be in a parking lot if you didn't have car in the lot. The ordinances allowed police to arrest anyone seen trying door handles of cars, attempting to conceal themselves, carrying tools used to break into vehicles, or running away from a police officer. Anita Beaty, from the Atlanta Task Force for the Homeless, in her visit to Sydney in August 1998, stated 'We noticed that a year out, folks were being arrested routinely, just by being on the street, that oppression built up and reached fever pitch a year away from the Games'. One of the central city parks, which was a place where homeless people were free to be, closed.

We wound up having curfews so that after 11pm no public parks could be occupied. The only people there after 11pm were homeless people anyway. 'The crackdown on homeless people is graphically illustrated by the fact that 10,000 homeless people were arrested in downtown Atlanta from July 1995 to July 1996 ­ more than four times the usual number ­ and the arrest of homeless people skyrocketed in the week leading up to the Games'.

'Some might argue that Sydney is a different city than Atlanta. It certainly is different. Whereas in Atlanta new laws were required to carry out this task of cleaning up the streets for the Olympics, police in NSW already have these powers, through the Police and Public Safety Act, the Drug Misuse and Trafficking Act, and other laws, which give police wide discretionary powers'

The Director of the new pre trial detention centre described the prison as 'the first Olympic venue to be completed on time'. Many community groups saw the construction of this prison as intended to house homeless people over the Olympics. The Atlanta Task Force for the Homeless mounted a federal law suit based on these pre-Olympic arrests. Recently settled that suit for wrongful arrests saw monetary damages paid to the homeless plaintiffs, and requirements for monitoring of police activity and arrest of homeless people by the Task Force. But this was too little, too late.

Some might argue that Sydney is a different city than Atlanta. It certainly is different. Whereas in Atlanta new laws were required to carry out this task of cleaning up the streets for the Olympics, police in NSW already have these powers, through the Police and Public Safety Act, the Drug Misuse and Trafficking Act, and other laws, which give police wide discretionary powers.

However, there are also similarities. Urban redevelopment, spurred on by the Olympics, has consistent, predictable consequences. Pressure on the private rental market leading to rent hikes, the transformation of boarding houses into tourist accommodation, and the reduction in housing for people with low incomes inevitably leads to an increase in homelessness. With a simultaneous interest in sprucing up the city in time for the Olympics, this leads to trouble for society's 'undesirables'. In NSW, populist law and order campaigns pose the solution to 'crime crisis' as the strengthening of the capacity of the criminal justice system to control and suppress crime. This means more police, with greater powers, heavier penalties for offenders, and general moves away from procedures which work to protect the principle that an accused person is innocent until proven guilty.

The Olympics, building on the ancient Roman tradition of 'bread and festivals' to soothe the restless plebs may be seen as a tool to win the hearts and minds of a fragmented society, a symbol and instrument of community unification. However paradoxically the hosting of the Games may force a recognition and solidification of social divisions by further discriminatory use of the discretionary powers available in the policing of public space.

by Tim Anderson
 

Special Branch files; notorious for their errors and poor quality information, may be difficult to amend or correct.

For this reason, and for reasons of privacy, the Council for Civil Liberties has proposed that individuals be able to have their files destroyed, under Archives Authority supervision.

Soon, the NSW Police will open the files of their former Special Branch to public access, if the recommendations of the Working Party on Special Branch are accepted. Police management has moved away from an earlier restrictive model to the Freedom of Information Act model, possibly with some improvements.

What this means is that individuals will be able to apply directly to police (a public announcement should be made on this) to access their file and, per the FOI Act, amend any errors! Those who have already requested their files should be contacted, and requested to renew their application, citing the Freedom of Information Act.

While Special Branch, and its North Sydney based successor the Protective Security Group have blanket exemptions under the FOI Act, the Police Service can choose to ignore this. The FOI Act is also a user-pays system, but the Working Party is urging Police management to waive the fee for requests on individual files, at least for the first twelve months.

'He agreed with the Royal Commission, that Special Branch had disregarded its charter, was unaccountable and operated "under a cloak of secrecy", had abused money set aside for informant payments, had poor record keeping practices, kept unreasonable and irrelevant files on individuals and had little success in relation to 'subversive' activities'

Special Branch files, notorious for their errors and poor quality information, may be difficult to amend or correct. For this reason, and for reasons of privacy, the Council for Civil Liberties has proposed that individuals be able to have their files destroyed, under Archives Authority supervision. Police have not yet responded to this proposal.

The FOI model still allows government departments to withhold files on a large number of grounds. Exemptions relevant to police would be:

i)    Protection of the identity of confidential informants;
ii)   Ongoing criminal investigation (mostly irrelevant to the Special Branch files), and
iii)  Protection of the privacy of others. Police may also try to keep secret documents forwar ed from other agencies, such as ASIO.

Special Branch was disbanded during the Police Royal Commission in 1997. The Head of the Police Integrity Commission, Judge Paul Urquart, reported to Parliament in June 1998 on the results of his investigation into Branch records. He agreed with the Royal Commission, that Special Branch had disregarded its charter, was unaccountable and operated "under a cloak of secrecy", had abused money set aside for informant payments, had poor record keeping practices, kept unreasonable and irrelevant files on individuals and had little success in relation to 'subversive' activities.

On the destruction of records, the PIC observed that of the 10,324 dossiers created between 1939 and 1997, only 1079 remained. In 1977, the Privacy Committee noted that 50,000 cards had been culled (as 'inactive') but not destroyed; however, by 1980 they had been destroyed. The Privacy Committee review of 1977 found 3,500 active and 6,000 inactive dossiers By 1980, 5,500 of the inactive dossiers had been destroyed.

The PIC observed that Special Branch objectives and Mission Statements had changed on several occasions. In 1975, the Police Commissioner had directed the Branch to look at "subversive and extremist activities", to anticipate activities which might lead to "violence or civil disorder", to monitor "proposed demonstrations and protests where breaches of the peace may occur", to look at "the activities of various factions within the ethnic communities".

After the 1978, Privacy Committee report "subversive and extremist activities" were removed from the brief. At the time of its disbanding in 1997, the Special Branch aims were formally focussed on "politically motivated violence or extremist activity", "violence or civil disorder", "the rival factions within the Ethnic Communities", security escorts and security reviews. The PIC observed that there was: "no evidence of any attempt to publicise each reworking of the [Mission] Statement ... the tinkering with the Mission Statement was ... no more than window dressing. It had no impact on the day to day activities of the Special Branch, which were never held up to close scrutiny or revision".

Changes in language were also used to evade financial scrutiny. The informants fund had been used for 'long lunches' with informants or other officers. When the new Police Service policy on informants (the Informant Management Plan, oversighted by ICAC) was introduced in 1994, Special Branch chose simply to describe its informants as 'community contacts' and, thus, not subject to the Plan.

While VIP security work was said to have been performed "conscientiously and competently", the PIC criticised the relationship Special Branch developed with some VIPs. The security relationship with judges for example was said to bear "no resemblance to the procedures prescribed in the 1989 Judicial Officers Security Plan", where the Sheriff's office was said to mediate so as to prevent the development of direct relationships between police and judges. The PIC said: "What is unsatisfactory is the lack of any written acknowledgment of such a relationship between the judges and Special

Branch". Adding this to the Yeldham affair meant that there was "the possibility that other incidents involving public figures could have occurred and [may have] been smoothed over by Special Branch, and any records destroyed".Special Branch fielded inquiries from Ministers, some requests for security clearances and some employment checks from other government departments.

While the PIC found "no evidence" of Special Branch information being used to an individual's detriment in an employment check, there was the real possibility that its unreliable and unchecked information could have had "serious adverse consequences" in such a situation.

The PIC noted that 'subversive' activities monitored included: "trade union marches, anti-logging protests, demonstrations against the third runway and protests against cuts to legal aid". A great deal of irrelevant and unreliable information was gathered, and the PIC commented:

"The majority of people who became the subject of index cards could not have been reasonably described as representing a threat of politically motivated violence or subversive or extremist activity".

The PIC spoke disparagingly of the assembly of Special Branch "dirt files" and the poor quality of their information.

The New Protective Security Group

Soon after disbanding the Special Branch, Commissioner Ryan foreshadowed the setting up of a "Protective Security Response Group", with a charter similar to that of the old Special Branch, arguing such a body had a role to play in preparation for the Sydney Olympic Games in 2000. Royal Commissioner, Justice Wood commented: "This [group's] mission is not dissimilar to that of the former Special Branch and concern naturally arises as to whether the PSRG might replicate the past practices".

Wood went on to propose a new body, like the proposed PSRG, to provide VIP protection and carry out related threat assessment. However, his support was conditional on:

i)    strict controls as proposed by the Police Commissioner;
ii)   a review of the body at the end of the Olympic Games, and
iii)  an annual audit of the new body.

Most of these conditions were addressed by the Police Legislation Amendment (Protective Security Group) Act 1998, which became law in July 1998, just as the Working Party on Special Branch was set up. The new Protective Security Group (PSG), under Superintendent Carolyn Smith, is said to be quite different to the old Special Branch, and says it wants little, if anything, to do with the records of the former Special Branch.

There are, however, a number of disturbing parallels, even at this early stage. The old Special Branch was criticised by the PIC for its secret charter; the Police Legislation Amendment (Protective Security Group) Act 1998 mentions a 'charter' but does not provide one word to explain what this charter actually is. The old Special Branch was said to have spent 75% of its time on VIP protection: the PSG is also said to be 75% focussed on VIP protection. The rest is, presumably 'intelligence gathering' or 'threat assessment'. The old Special Branch had 32 officers: the new PSG has maintained its strength at 32 officers.

Has Special Branch really gone away?

"What is tragic is that someone like Cheryl Black should find herself in prison in the first place, and that she should eventually die there"

Cheryl Black was found dead in Cell 4, B Wing, Unit A1 of the CCA owned and operated Metropolitan Women's Correctional Centre at 7.05 am on 30th March, 1997. It was Easter Sunday. Cheryl Black had become the first woman to die in custody in Victoria's first private prison. She was the first woman to die in custody in Victoria in the last three years.

Cheryl Black had been institutionalised for most of her life. Cheryl was intellectually disabled, and suffered from a number of illnesses including epilepsy, asthma and emphysema. Cheryl was also a victim of abuse, both sexual and psychological. A 1993 psychiatric report described her as a tragic case.

What is tragic is that someone like Cheryl Black should find herself in prison in the first place, and that she should eventually die there.

With the commencement of the inquest, it quickly became clear that Cheryl had been shuffled from one institution to another for most of her life. Even in the last few months of her life, she had been passed from caseworker to caseworker. Cheryl was a difficult "client". No doubt there were some who breathed a sigh of relief when Cheryl was taken off their hands and placed on remand at MWCC on 3rd March, 1997.

Robert Moreton, of the Victoria Police Prison Squad, made it clear that the question of whether Cheryl should have been placed in prison was not within the scope of his investigation, and flagged it as a separate issue to the circumstances surrounding the death of Cheryl Black. As was the case with the inquest into the death of Paul Prosser, the causal relationship between death and imprisonment was not to be investigated. One should have the right to ask whether Cheryl would still be alive, today, had she been placed in more appropriate accommodation? The inquest into the death of Cheryl Black began at the Coroner's Court in South Melbourne on 16th June. Members of PJA, Women In Imprisonment and the, newly formed, Victorian Deaths in Custody Watch Committee held a memorial outside the court entrance.

Some spoke a few words and flowers were placed under a portrait of Cheryl; a reminder that real people lie behind the government statistics on deaths in custody.

Both the Villa Manta Legal Service and The Corrections Working Group were refused standing to appears at the inquest, on the basis that they did not have a sufficient interest in the outcome (ie, they were not a family member or spouse, and did not have a direct interest, in that they were not a party open to having an adverse finding made against them as a result of the inquest). Parties allowed representation at the Inquest are the Department of Human Services (the Disability Division managed Cheryl's case file and made arrangements for Cheryl's welfare), the Office of Corrective Services Commissioner, Corrections Corporation Australia, Mercy Hospital (who held the contract for provision of medical services at MWCC in March '97), and K., Cheryl Black's partner.

For two days medical staff and officers from MWCC testified as to their dealings with Cheryl during her last few weeks inside MWCC. Evidence was given regarding medication administered to Cheryl, maintenance of her medical records and the level of inter-departmental communication regarding Cheryl's background and medical history. Testimony was also given on management methods and prison procedure; the operation of the cell intercom system causing the most confusion among all concerned. Proceedings were then adjourned until 14th August, the Coroner calling a further witness, the systems technician at MWCC, to interpret the computer logs of both the intercom system and the door movements to Unit A1.

Following the testimony of both the systems technician and the investigating officer from the Police Prison Squad on the 14th August, the inquest was again adjourned until a date yet to be determined.

The Coroner has once again called for further witnesses to be made available, when the inquest resumes, in an effort to solve the many mysteries which appear to have arisen in this inquest and have, so far, defied explanation.

I urge every one of you to attend the inquest when it resumes. Many issues have already arisen throughout the course of evidence, which may give cause for concern. Although they may be found legally not to be the cause of Cheryl's death, we have to ask whether, it is likely, they were a contributing factor, and how this can be prevented from happening again.

Peoples Justice Alliance

On 20th July, 1998, Victorian Coroner, Jacinta Heffey, handed down her findings in the inquest into the death of Paul Mark Prosser at "D" division in the Metropolitan Reception Prison, Coburg, on 14th December, 1996. At approximately 7.42pm on that date, Paul, 23 years of age, was found hanging from the electrical conduit in his cell by a pair of shoelaces.

Paul had been arrested on 4th December whilst on bail. In the cells at Broadmeadows Police Station, he attempted to hang himself with a blanket. The following morning, he attempted to choke himself while left alone in an interview room. After appearing in the Magistrates Court later that day, Paul was remanded to the Melbourne Custody Centre, where he was placed in a padded cell overnight and considered to be at risk of self-harm, although not a suicide risk. On 5th December, 1996, Paul was admitted to the Metropolitan Reception prison, where he was classified and sent to D Division.

Paul suffered from a brain injury, the result of a motorcycle accident, causing some incognitive impairment and mood swings. He had been at Pentridge previously, and had spent the entire time in G Division, housing the Acute Assessment Unit and the Psycho-Social Unit.

From the time that Paul arrived at Pentridge on 5th December, 1996, he expressed to prison staff, forensic, medical and nursing staff, other prisoners and his family his desire to be transferred to G Division. The Coroner determined that there were three issues arising for determination in terms of how the death occurred:-

1.   Whether the deceased's death might, on the balance of probabilities, have been avoided had he been transferred to G Division, either on reception into the prison or at any time thereafter.

2.   Whether it was reasonable, based on the deceased's history and presentation, not to transfer the deceased to G Division on admission or at any time thereafter.

3.   If it was unreasonable not to transfer the deceased to G Division, whether the staff responsible for recommending such a transfer omitted to do so for a reason unconnected with the deceased's mental state.

In relation to the first issue, the Coroner found that it was less likely that Paul would have committed suicide had he been transferred to G Division.

Regarding the second issue, the Coroner made a number of findings:-

a)   The decision to place Paul Prosser in the mainstream prison was made on inadequate information, and that, if there were time constraints in terms of obtaining records, placement should have been provisional only. The decison to place a prisoner who, to the knowledge of the assessing person, has had previous placement in a psychiatric unit, should not have been made without access to all the information.

b)   The decision to place Paul Prosser in the mainstream prison was wrong and it should not have been made.

c)   Subsequent assessments by prison staff were flawed and inadequate. Paul Prosser should have been placed in AAU on reception, or at the very least, referred to a psychiatrist. On the third issue, the Coroner declined to hand down a finding, on the basis that it had not been supported by any evidence in the inquest other than "speculation and hypothesis".

Despite her findings that the prison was more than lax in it's assessment and placement of arriving prisoners, the Coroner, in summing up, found "...the deceased and no other person contributed to the cause of death.". The Coroner was acting on the premise that even if Paul had been transferred to G Division, he still may have taken his own life. But that is something we will never know. We only know that Paul wanted to be in the AAU, and he should have been in the AAU. Instead, he died.

Coroner Heffey's recommendations at the conclusion of her record of investigation ­ regarding availability of full medical histories in the shortest possible time, provisional placements, appropriate safeguards, monitoring and assessments, implementation of procedures for facilitation of information from family and friends ­ were duly forwarded to the Attorney-General, The Office of Correctional Services Commissioner and Department of Human Services but, until they are actually acted upon, and implemented within the prison system, cases like that of Paul Prosser will continue to haunt the Government.

Peoples Justice Alliance